

I-POST

Quarterly

IPCS PROGRAM ON SUICIDE TERRORISM

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INTRODUCTION

Pakistan is the latest country to fall prey to the suicide terrorism campaign after Iraq and Afghanistan. Like in the case of its predecessors, the phenomenon surfaced in Pakistan in 2002 following the launch of the US war on terror. While it started off as a sporadic, albeit lethal, occurrence in Pakistan, it has today acquired an unprecedented momentum and is threatening to become a part of everyday life for Pakistanis. 2007, in particular has witnessed an exceptional increase in the number of suicide attacks and the trend is unlikely to slow down in the days to come.


Initially, the campaign in Pakistan had a very strong sectarian component. The majority of the attacks were directed at minorities such as Shias, Brelvi Sunnis and Ahmadiyas, seen largely as a result of the predominance of the Wahhabi school of thought which considers certain Islamic sects as infidels. Anti-Shia sentiment was further compounded as a result of growing anti-US sentiment, particularly after the installation of a Shia-dominated

government in Iraq. However, since 2006, the campaign underwent a transformation of sorts – a large proportion of the attacks began to be employed by insurgents in Pakistan’s tribal areas against security forces and government installations with an almost concomitant fall in the use of suicide attacks in sectarian violence. Moreover, this shift in targets was also accompanied by an unparalleled increase in the frequency of such attacks. Taking the period from the beginning of 2006 into consideration, this article seeks to dissect the campaign as it acquires ferocity and proceeds by drawing out the broad trends of the campaign.

CHOICE OF TARGETS

A clear shift in targets of the suicide terrorism campaign in Pakistan is noticeable since the beginning of 2006. Since then, Pakistan has witnessed large scale targeting of security forces (police posts, army checkpoints, military training areas), mostly in and around the tribal areas of North West Frontier Province (NWFP). For instance, if between 2002 and

No. of Suicide Attacks



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2005, only one suicide attack out of a total of 15 attacks across Pakistan was directed at an army checkpoint (3 June 2004 in North Waziristan, Federally Administered Tribal Area), since 2006, as many as 10 out of 20 attacks have been directed at security forces – an increase of over 40 per cent. Conversely, suicide attacks in sectarian violence have fallen considerably. During 2002-2005, nine attacks out of 15 were used in sectarian violence, whereas since 2006 only two such attacks out of 20 have been reported – a 50 per cent fall. In addition, attacks on political leaders have also increased, albeit with limited success.


between 2002 and 2005, only one suicide attack out of a total of 15 attacks across Pakistan was directed at an army checkpoint. Since 2006, as many as 10 out of 20 attacks have been directed at security forces – an increase of over 40 per cent.

When and why did the insurgency in the tribal region adopt the method of suicide attacks? Does it signal a deterioration of the security situation in the region or a state of desperation for the insurgents? A cocktail of factors can be held responsible. Foremost is the consolidation of the Taliban in the tribal areas of Pakistan. Since the tribal areas of Pakistan were the natural gateway to Afghanistan, following the toppling of the Taliban regime in late 2001, pro-Taliban and

al Qaeda terrorists were believed to be sheltered by the Wazir tribe inhabiting the border region of South Waziristan. In spite of the launch of military operations by the Pakistani army in the region to hunt down suspected militants, there were repeated attacks on security forces and on locals suspected to be US spies and activists. With the support of the tribal leaders, the Taliban successfully extended their administrative and judicial reach into several towns and cities such as Bannu, Tank, Dera Ismail Khan, Bara and parts of Peshawar. A result of their growing influence was the latest peace pact signed between Taliban leaders in North Waziristan and Islamabad in September 2006 (two earlier agreements were signed between South Waziristan and Islamabad in April 2004 and February 2005). Among other things, the deal bound the government to cease ground and air assaults against the Taliban, redeploy its troops from North Waziristan to their designated camps and forts, and dismantle all the checkpoints set up in the region.

Meanwhile, action by the Pakistani government against such elements increased in

Target of Suicide Attacks, 2002-2007



late 2005 as a result of mounting international pressure following the revelation of a link between the suspects in the 7 July 2005 London attacks with *madrassas* in Pakistan. Measures such as mandatory registration of all religious schools, the arrest of many extremists under the Maintenance of Public Order Act in August 2005, the government's decision to expel foreign students from religious schools and increasing raids on *madrassas* were designed to allay doubts about

Pakistan's commitment in the war on terror. These measures however injected a doubt in the minds of pro-Taliban militants about the reliability of Pakistan in their jihad. Military operations also intensified in NWFP to hunt down foreign elements that led to heavy casualties among the local Taliban and tribals in the region. Facing the heat of the crackdown and fearing a collapse of their terror havens in the region, the Taliban retaliated. The tipping point in the campaign it is argued was the Bajaur agency incident on 30 October 2006 where a local *madrassa* was bombed in North Waziristan killing 80 people just a month after the peace deal. While the Pakistani army claimed the school was being used as a military training camp, the local residents regarded the killing of innocent people as a direct attack against Islam. Many in fact believe that the attack was carried out by American forces. This instance can be said to have cemented suspicions among the pro-Taliban militants about Islamabad's commitment to its side of the

peace deal and of its connivance with America.

The Taliban had repeatedly threatened to launch suicide attacks against security forces if their demands were not met. Therefore the rise of suicide attacks in the region should come as no surprise, especially after the success of the method against Afghan and US-led coalition forces.



A wounded Pakistani soldier was helped after a suicide bombing at Dargai, Pakistan, in November. The attack killed 44 military cadets. Source: <http://www.nytimes.com>

Suicide attacks have also been carried out against political leaders and

government functionaries such as lawyers and ministers across Pakistan. Notable targets include the Pakistani Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz and Interior Minister Aftab Khan Sherpao. While the former was attacked in Islamabad, the latter was attacked during a political rally in Peshawar. This suggests that they are victims of the insurgency in NWFP. However, since the beginning of 2007,

government functionaries have also been threatened by radical Islamic elements waging a movement to enact Islamic law in the country. The movement spearheaded by the head cleric of Lal Masjid, Mohammad Abdul Aziz, repeatedly issued threats of suicide attacks against law enforcement agencies in Pakistan for their crackdown on the movement.

The above developments lead to several conclusions. First, the escalation of violence by the Taliban responds directly to a changed strategy of the Pakistani government in

international and regional relations (close alliance with the US in the war on terror and the decision to abandon support to Afghan Taliban). The objective is clearly to undermine

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the government's efforts in the war on terrorism. Second, the signing of as many as three peace pacts within a span of three years between Islamabad and pro-Taliban forces in the FATA region is a pointer to the fact that the method of suicide attacks is used as a last resort in an insurgency. It invariably follows what is perceived by the militants as a breakdown of peace initiatives and talks reflecting the lack of the state's political will. This leads us to believe that the increasing use of the method reflects as much the deteriorating security and political situation in the region as the desperation of the insurgents. Third, an examination of the development of suicide terrorism in Pakistan also confirms one of the core arguments of experts such as Robert Pape who say that the method is not linked to Islamic fundamentalism alone, that it is secular in motive and is employed by militants to liberate their land from occupation, direct or indirect, by foreign democratic states.

TIMING

A survey of suicide attacks in Pakistan since 2006 suggests that the campaign tends to accelerate in response to military operations by the state. They have invariably followed the launch of an operation by the army or an assault that killed innocent people. For instance, the suicide attack on 7 November 2006 at a military convoy in Dargai that left 35 soldiers dead is believed to have been carried out to avenge the Bajaur attack. Similarly, the recent raid by the security forces into the complex of the Lal Masjid once again incited a violent reaction in the tribal belt with at least two powerful suicide attacks within a week of the operation, claiming at least a hundred lives. The timing therefore suggests that the campaign is used by the militants mostly as a revenge tactic to display their resolve and capability to fight security forces. However, while this shows that the suicide bombing campaign in Pakistan is increasingly becoming the main method of retaliation against the government, it has still

while the suicide bombing campaign in Pakistan is increasingly becoming the main method of retaliation against the government, it has still not acquired a tactical salience as in the case of Iraq where the campaign is used consistently by the insurgents to not only retaliate against the government and security forces but also to intimidate Iraqi civilians into collaboration.

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GEOGRAPHY

The majority of the attacks have taken place in the FATA region of NWFP with occasional attacks in other districts such as Dir, Swat, Bannu, Tank, and Peshawar. Miranshah in North Waziristan has particularly suffered due to suicide attacks. Several factors are responsible for this. First, the return of the security forces to their checkpoints that were abandoned in September 2006 has consolidated the impression among the pro-Taliban militants that the government is not serious about its commitment to the ceasefire. Second, since early 2007, South Waziristan has been engulfed by a clash between local Pashtun Taliban and non-native al Qaeda linked Uzbek militants in the region that erupted in fierce fighting between the two in March 2007. Internal rivalry between Taliban forces in the region seems to have deflected their attention from their *jihād*.

Significantly, while the attacks in North Waziristan have been directed only at the security forces, other districts have witnessed attacks in public places such as hotels and political rallies. This suggests that as the government decides to deploy troops in the other districts of NWFP such as Tank, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan, these regions will likely witness an acceleration of violence.

METHODS

A cursory glance at the attacks from 2002 to 2006 reveals that between the two methods of suicide attacks – car bombs and human bombs – there has been a heavy reliance on the latter in Pakistan. However, since 2006, there have been growing instances of the use of car bombs (mainly explosives-laden jeeps)

mostly in the NWFP. The main method is to ram an explosive- laden vehicle into an army convoy. Since the damage caused by car bombs exceeds that of human explosions, their increasing use is a clear sign of the deteriorating situation in the region. In addition, it also points towards a possible escalation of casualties in the days ahead. Notably, the use of car bombs is a trademark of the insurgency in Iraq and has been used to wreak havoc in the country. Also, there have been instances of more than one suicide bomber involved in a particular attack – a hallmark of al Qaeda mass casualty attacks.


PERPETRATORS

There is a lack of clarity on the origins of suicide bombers in Pakistan. In the NWFP, while it is clear that the Taliban is behind this campaign, very little details are available of the local groups involved. The local Taliban has denied responsibility in a number of attacks which indicates the possibility of local rebels taking to the campaign of their volition without any connection with the *jihād* being waged by various pan-Islamic organisations

allied with the al Qaeda. However, it is possible that the Taliban is deliberately maintaining anonymity in order to mislead the government into believing that the campaign is largely imported from across the border and does not represent domestic unrest. This is intended to push the government into employing harsher methods of tracking ‘foreign’ elements and, in the process, inflict greater casualties on the locals. Through this, the Taliban aims to further distance the people from the state by projecting it as an oppressor. Indeed, the Pakistani government’s excessive focus on the hunt for foreign elements might just turn this strategy into a success for the Taliban.

On the other hand, security agencies suspect the hand of pro-Taliban groups like the Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi behind many such attacks. Founded in 1992, the outfit operates mainly around the tribal regions of Swat and Dir in NWFP. Since one of its prominent leaders, Maulana Liaquat, was killed in the aerial attack in Bajaur, this outfit is believed to be behind the recent

Total number of casualties



spate of attacks in the Swat region. This and other groups are fighting to retain and strengthen control of the Taliban in FATA and other districts of NWFP so as to enable the use of this belt as the operational base for *jihād* in Afghanistan. Through the attacks, the Taliban is sending a clear message to the government to withdraw their support for the war on terror.

Meanwhile, the recent threat of suicide attacks by religious extremists in Islamabad is seen as a sign of rising militant Islamist mobilization in Pakistan. Such forces are being spearheaded by the clerics and students of Lal Masjid with a clear objective to impose the *sharia* in Pakistan and fight against western influences. Incidents such as that of Nilofar Bakhtiar, the Federal Minister for Tourism, hugging a French para-glider or the decision of Britain to award the knighthood to Salman Rushdie are being used by this camp to justify suicide attacks. Significantly, the students of Jamia Hafsa and Lal Masjid are believed to come from the tribal belt of Waziristan. This goes to suggest that the suicide terror campaigns in Pakistan are deeply inter-connected and might be driven by Taliban militants seeking to Talibanize the entire region.

CONCLUSION

For a country already rife with internal conflicts and violence, suicide attacks threaten to entrench violence deeply in the fabric of Pakistani society. Arising in the aftermath of the US war on terror, the attacks were initially employed by sectarian extremist groups against each other. Today, however, they are primarily used by insurgents and Islamic militants against security and government forces. In the NWFP, the attacks have now spread to regions beyond the FATA and those hitherto unaffected by violence. The number of attacks rocketed as the insurgency

developed and the military operations by the Pakistani army intensified. With the government recently deploying thousands of additional security forces in the NWFP and the failure of the peace pact signed in September, the attacks are unlikely to abate any time soon. A striking feature of the campaign in Pakistan is that it is being used both as a means of political struggle, as seen in the case of the insurgency in the NWFP, and for religious crusade, as represented by the clerics of the Lal Masjid. The Taliban is suspected to be guiding both struggles. Since suicide terrorism it is argued is a result of large scale community support (considered essential not only for consistent recruitment but also to avoid detection, surveillance and elimination by security forces), the use of this method in both the struggles speak volumes of the domestic unrest within Pakistan.

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The increasing use of this method suggests that Pakistan's carrot and stick strategy of dealing with extremists – rewarding them with greater power and control through peace deals on the one hand and punishing them for defiance on the other – is not working. The extremists have stepped up levels of violence and have managed to create an atmosphere of fear within Pakistan. Today, they are able to command popular support and are succeeding in destroying efforts by the security forces in maintaining law and order. Most importantly, the attacks have further undermined the faith of the people in President Musharraf's administration. With the President facing elections at the end of the year, it is absolutely imperative for him to review not only the current strategy in dealing with extremists, but also Pakistan's stand on issues of its national interest such as its alliance with the US in the war on terror.

Chronology of Suicide Attacks in Pakistan (January 2006-June 2007)

Date	Place	Location	Casualties			Injured	Group	Modus Operandi
			SF	CIV	Total			

2006

09-Feb	NWFP	Shia Muslims		37	37	100		bomber
02-Mar	Karachi	US consulate		4	4			car bomb
11-Apr	Karachi	Sunni Muslims		57	57	100		bomber
28-May	N. Waziristan	police post	3		3			car bomb
02-Jun	N. Waziristan	army	4		4	8		car bomb
26-Jun	N. Waziristan	army checkpoint	6		6	2		car bomb
14-Jul	Karachi			1	1	2		bomber
06-Aug	Quetta	main market						bomber
08-Nov	Dargai, NWFP	military base	35		35			bomber
17-Nov	Peshawar	police van				2		bomber
04-Dec	Peshawar	checkpoint	1		1			bomber

2007

26-Jan	Islamabad	Mariott Hotel	1		1	6		bomber
29-Jan	Dera Ismail Khan		3	1	3			bomber
03-Feb	Tank	military convoy	2		2	7		car bomb
07-Feb	Islamabad	airport parking area				2		bomber
17-Feb	Quetta	Court		16	16	35		bomber
29-Mar	Islamabad	military training area	1		1	7		bomber
28-Apr	NWFP	political rally		28	28	52		bomber
15-May	Peshawar	Marhaba Hotel		25	25	35		bomber
28-May	Bannu	FC vehicle	2			1		car bomb

Eric Koo Peng Kuan
Freelancer, Singapore

Suicide bombing, it appears, goes hand in hand with the quest of acquiring the all powerful nuclear bomb. In mid-April 2006, Iran announced publicly that it had established an entire force of some 40,000 suicide bombers in response to threats of military strikes from the US and the West. Iran, has in effect, 'legalized' suicide bombing as a state strategy, complete with proper registration forms for Iranian volunteers for martyrdom missions, with personal choices whether the individual wished to attack targets in Israel or the US.¹



Iranian women dressed as suicide bombers during a demonstration in Teheran, July 31, 2006. (Source: Tom Gross, Mideast Media Analysis. <http://www.tomgrossmedia.com/Hizbullahiran.html>)

This force, named the Special Unit of Martyrdom Seekers in the Revolutionary Guards, was revealed when members marched in a military parade, with explosive packs around their waists and detonators held high.²

The display and subsequent media reporting of military formations of suicide bombers clearly had a political purpose. It demonstrated the belief in the effectiveness of the suicide bomber in hitting back at strong states like the US, and the coming of age of suicide terrorism as a modern military and political weapon.

Despite the fact that the military calculus clearly favoured the US and the West in conventional wars, the former has hesitated in

taking full-scale military action against Iran, popularly perceived as a nuclear threat. The Bush Administration's attempts at subtle threats – such as “not leaving out the military option against Iran,” a euphemism for war – have been largely dismissed as political posturing. Indeed, there are experts who even advise against it, citing the debacle in Iraq.³

Thus far, the policy against Iran's nuclear ambitions has been limited to diplomacy. Tehran, however, understands the psychology of the West's manipulations of international politics, of employing bluster as political showmanship, and has not yielded an inch in negotiations since

late 2003, when it was first detected that Iran had nuclear facilities. Clearly, diplomatic negotiations, unless backed up by force, do not work in the nuclear issue context.

IMPLICATIONS OF A NUCLEAR IRAN

Despite the controversial argument of the “clash of civilizations” between the West and the Islamic world being repeatedly criticized, international events that took place since September 11 have hardly endeared the US, and the West in general, in the eyes of Muslims worldwide. First, the Iraq war has directly or indirectly caused the deaths of 30,000 to 100,000 Iraqis. The ongoing insurgency, social instability and the failure to create any semblance of a unified, progressive and peaceful Iraq, remains a

¹ “US planned campaign against Iran before Iraq War,” *Today*, 17 April 2006

² “Iran suicide bombers ready to strike,” *The Straits Times* 17 April 2006

³ “US tries to dampen talk of Iran Strike,” *Associated Press* 10 April 2006 “U.S. may launch strike on Iran,” *Today* 10 April 2006

blemish on America's international reputation. Each day of terrorist violence in Iraq is testament to the monumental mistakes of the Bush Administration's policies in Iraq since March 2003.

Secondly, the Bush Administration's foreign policy in Palestine, with its cutting of aid to the Hamas-dominated Palestinian government in favour of President Mahmoud Abbas' Fatah faction may well lead to more economic hardship for the Palestinian people in the future. In view of Hamas' political and military success in seizing control of the Gaza strip from Fatah's hands in mid-June, the Fatah-biased US foreign policy could well provide political oxygen for Hamas and the Palestinians to throw in their lot more firmly with Iran in a bid for survival. There will be no lack of volunteers for suicide bombers then.

The eventual development of nuclear power in Iran, along with a failure of the international community to act, may provide a safe haven for anti-West and anti-US elements that operate with impunity. This may well include the al Qaeda network led by Osama bin Laden, remnants of the Taliban waging an insurgency in Afghanistan and other Iranian supported groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon.

WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

In spite of all the visible signs of antagonism towards the US and the West, it may be deduced that Tehran does not desire, nor is it totally prepared for, a large scale war reminiscent of the Iraq war launched in 2003. Otherwise, contrary to all military (and political) sense, Tehran would not have put on a visible show of strength by staging a military parade of suicide bombers. This spectacle, like the logic of doggedly pursuing a nuclear program in spite of international opposition, was meant to deter Iran's perceived enemies.

Iran does not relish the fate of its neighbour, and it is logical that the Iranian Islamic regime does its best to avoid a war with the West, while simultaneously attempting to obtain insurance against external threats towards its state sovereignty.

Given that, at present, there is no effective measure, tactic or technological innovation that can eliminate or prevent suicide bombing, states are relying on the more ambiguous and less tangible policy of 'indirect measures' (or the 'soft' approach), in fighting suicide terrorism. Concerned states are addressing the issue of Islamic extremism by emphasizing education to combat radicalism, and by relying on inter-state diplomacy rather than on direct military measures alone.

The 'indirect measures' strategy against the dual threats of suicide terrorism and nuclear arms in the hands of 'hostile' states like Iran, is in reality, merely a short-term policy for the remainder of the 21st

century. In order to eradicate these threats completely, it is necessary to acknowledge the inevitability of Iranian power in the Middle East, and then reach out by means of economic engagement, such as foreign direct investment, trade links and other economic ties. By bringing Iran into the fold of the world market, its people and regime would have national and economic interests to consider instead of devoting resources to suicide bombers and building nuclear arms.

Only through the process of winning over the hearts of the Iranians, can the nuclear threat posed by Tehran ultimately be curbed. Meanwhile, unless there is a technological breakthrough in effectively identifying, detecting and preventing suicide bombers from operating, the threat of suicide bombing will remain for many years to come.

The display and subsequent media reporting of military formations of suicide bombers clearly had a political purpose. It demonstrated the belief in the effectiveness of the suicide bomber in hitting back at strong states like the US, and the coming of age of suicide terrorism as a modern military and political weapon.

ANALYSIS

Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan (April-June 2007)

Srinjoy Bose

Research Officer, IPCS

The second quarter (April-June) of year 2007 did not witness any unexpected or dramatic change in trends in suicide attacks across Afghanistan. However, since the death of Taliban commander Mullah Dadullah in May, the Taliban have significantly increased their attacks on Coalition and Afghan security forces, and have repeatedly threatened to unleash 'martyrs' on missions in Afghanistan and abroad.

PROPAGANDA

Taliban propaganda aims to acquire psychological advantage over Coalition forces (and those countries providing assistance to the Afghan government) battling a resurgent Taliban. In May, the new Taliban commander Mansur Dadullah (brother of the slain Mullah Dadullah) promised to avenge his brother's death by way of increased suicide attacks. Then, in June 2007, the Taliban released a video allegedly showing the so-called 'graduation ceremony' of would-be suicide bombers. Whether the Taliban are capable of dispatching suicide bombers outside Afghanistan remains to be seen but the video makes their intent clear, and the recent (attempted) terrorist incidents in London and Glasgow should prod Western governments into taking their threat seriously. The video also shows Mansur Dadullah delivering a fiery address aimed primarily at intimidating Western audiences, and designed to raise the cost of staying in Afghanistan. If attacking their soldiers/citizens in Afghanistan is not enough to make Western countries withdraw, then threatening to attack their homelands is the next logical step.

NUMBER OF ATTACKS

Notwithstanding Mansur Dadullah's threats, US officials, especially the military commanders,

consider suicide bombers in Afghanistan a bigger challenge than any organized offensive. Statistics compiled of bombings support the US assessment. The number of suicide bombing incidents rose from 21 in 2005 to 139 in 2006, and is likely to be still higher this year.

since the death of Taliban commander Mullah Dadullah in May, the Taliban have significantly increased their attacks on Coalition and Afghan security forces, and have repeatedly threatened to unleash 'martyrs' on missions in Afghanistan and abroad.

Data collected by the IPCS reveals a significant rise in the number of attacks in the second quarter of 2007 (18) as compared to the number of attacks reported during the preceding quarter (11), claiming twice as many lives (including civilians). In comparison to last year's statistics, whereas there were

only 10 incidents of reported bombings in the second quarter of 2006, the second quarter of 2007 saw the tally rise to 18; comparatively, the bombings over the past three months have been far more destructive and have claimed *six times* as many lives (including civilians). Whether or not such an increase can be attributed to an intensified insurgency aimed at avenging the killing of Mullah Dadullah is anybody's guess.

CHILD/TEENAGE SUICIDE BOMBERS

The previous issue of the *I-POST* (Vol. 4, Iss. 1, January-March 2007) discusses in detail the Taliban's depraved, yet effective method(s) of recruiting children and teenagers for suicide missions. The 'conditioning process' (training received by would-be martyrs, mostly at *madrassas* in Pakistan) has remained much the same.

In recent times, instances of children being trained for suicide operations have been made public by Afghan government officials. Since April, at least three teenagers are reported to have been recruited and trained by the Taliban – the whereabouts/details of two remain

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
unknown. The third, fourteen-year-old Rafiqullah (from Pakistan) was apprehended by Afghan intelligence officials late in June; his mission – to kill an Afghan governor. The teenager alleges that he was taught to drive vehicles and was shown videos of suicide bombers at a Pakistani *madrassa* where he was sent to receive an education. Since his apprehension, President Karzai has pardoned Rafiqullah and publicly censured the militants (calling them “enemies of Islam”) who convinced the teenager to cooperate.

Manipulation and coercion are effective

the preceding quarter. This increase in success rate can be explained, in part, by the Taliban’s effective use of the suicide ‘bomber on foot’ in insurgent operations.

MODUS OPERANDI

The Taliban continue to favour the ‘bomber on foot’ (wearing explosives) as compared to the suicide ‘car bomber.’ Out of the 18 incidents recorded, 10 were carried out by bombers whose choices of targets indicate they are becoming not only more brazen, but also acutely aware of the benefits of penetrating thought-to-be safe areas,¹ thereby further



methods used by militants to bully children into carrying out terrorist and other heinous acts, including suicide bombing. In June, a male six-year old was forced to wear a vest laden with explosives and instructed to walk up to American soldiers patrolling Ghazni city. A potential attack was averted when the child approached Afghan soldiers in the vicinity for help. In similar fashion, speaking to the *Associated Press*, the aforementioned Rafiqullah claimed one of his ‘handlers’ in Afghanistan had threatened to kill him when he expressed fear over his looming task/fate.

SUCCESS RATES (DEATH TOLL)

For the period April-June 2007, the death toll for security force personnel was 63, while the toll for civilians stood at anywhere between 27 and 52. Statistics demonstrate the Taliban have been far more successful in targeting security force personnel than previously – an increase of 42 casualties when compared to

undermining Coalition/government efforts to secure a lasting peace. For instance, in early July, a suicide bomber killed five policemen and injured a dozen in an attack carried out at a police checkpoint in the southeastern Afghan town of Spin Boldak. The fact that the bomber, dressed as a policeman, sat with the other men while they lunched, lends credence to this analysis. The preference for such a tactic is also evident in the success rates. Statistics reveal suicide bombers have claimed 61 out of 63 documented security force personnel casualties – an overwhelming 97 per cent of all security force personnel casualties.

¹ It is easier for the ‘bomber on foot’ (in disguise) to breach security measures than for car bombers whose vehicles are stopped, scrutinized and checked more thoroughly.

Chronology of Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan (April-June 2007)

Date	Month	Place	Location/Target	Casualties			Injured	Group	Modus operandi
				SFs	Civ	Total			
13	April	Kabul		6		6		Taliban	Bomber
14	April	Khost	Border Police Unit Gate	8	1	9	5	Taliban	Bomber
16	April	Kunduz	Police Station	9		9	25	Taliban	Bomber
22	April	Khost	Market				6		Bomber
25	April	Paktika	District Governor						Bomber
17	May	Qandahar	Government Convoy		3	3			Car Bomber
19	May	Kunduz	Market/German Soldiers	3	6	9	17	Taliban	Bomber
20	May	Gardez	Market			14	32		Bomber
23	May	Kabul	Police	1	1	2	4	Taliban	Motorbike Bomber
28	May	Kunduz	Security Contractors		2	2		Taliban	Bomber
11	June	Khost	Police Checkpoint				11		Car Bomber
15	June	Uruzgan	NATO Convoy	1	9	10	10		Car Bomber
15	June	Qandahar	NATO Convoy			5			Bomber
16	June	Kabul	NATO Convoy		4	4	5		Car Bomber
17	June	Mazar-e-Sharif	Military Convoy		1	1			Motorbike Bomber
17	June	Kabul	Police Transport Bus	35		35	5	Taliban	Bomber
28	June	Kabul	Security Vehicles			4	5	Taliban	Car Bomber
28	June	Paktika	NATO Vehicle					Taliban	Car Bomber

ARTICLE REVIEW

Suicide Terrorism and Islamic Fundamentalism: A Critique of Robert Pape and Scott Atran

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Robert Pape, *Dying to Win: Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism* (New York: Random House, 2005); Scott Atran, "The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 29, No.2, Spring 2006, pp. 127-147

Why suicide terrorism? And why the sudden spurt in recent years? Is there a link between suicide terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism? If one goes by the recent history of terrorism, suicide terrorism clearly is a recent phenomenon; a post-1980s phenomenon to be specific. It started in the 1980s in the Middle East, with the Hezbollah pioneering such attacks in Lebanon. Though Robert Pape mentions the 'Assassins' and 'Kamikazes' in earlier history, they cannot be referred to as suicide bombers or perpetrators of suicide terrorism in the modern sense. Hence, there cannot be any historical link with earlier manifestations, for it would be erroneous.

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) were the first to copy the tactic from the Hezbollah and then mastered it in Sri Lanka. Suicide terrorism also became a strategic weapon in the hands of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) who employed it successfully in the 1990s. Though suicide bombing started in the 1980s, it never spread to Afghanistan, where the mujahideen were fighting a jihad against Soviet occupation. Thus, despite the use of religious symbols and terminologies relating to Islam, suicide terrorism never found its roots in Afghanistan during the period when Lebanon witnessed the emergence of this phenomenon. In retrospect, it is difficult to link religious fundamentalism, Islamic fundamentalism or political Islam to the

emergence of suicide terrorism in Lebanon and its absence in Afghanistan.

Scott Atran makes an important point comparing suicide terrorism in terms of number of acts perpetrated and the resultant casualties, to general terrorist attacks: "Although suicide attacks account for a minority of all terrorist acts, they are responsible for a majority of terrorism-related casualties." It is this fact that makes suicide terrorism the most deadly strategy employed by terrorists.

Scott Atran makes an important point comparing suicide terrorism in terms of number of acts perpetrated and the resultant casualties, to general terrorist attacks: "Although suicide attacks account for a minority of all terrorist acts, they are responsible for a majority of terrorism-related casualties." It is this fact that makes suicide terrorism the most deadly strategy employed by terrorists.

Most of the suicide attacks in recent years have taken place in Iraq and Afghanistan. If the facts relating to suicide terrorism in these two countries are considered, then one is likely to agree with Robert Pape's assertion that foreign occupation is the primary reason for suicide terrorism. Elsewhere in an interview, he again asserts, "The central fact is that overwhelmingly suicide-terrorist attacks are not driven by religion as much as they are by a clear strategic objective: to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from the territory that the terrorists view as their homeland. From Lebanon to Sri Lanka to Chechnya to Kashmir to the West Bank, every major suicide-terrorist campaign – over

95 percent of all the incidents – has had as its central objective to compel a democratic state to withdraw."

Can an argument be made then, in countries where terrorist acts are undertaken against foreign occupation that they are not 'symbolic' or 'demonstrative' in nature, but solely aimed at expelling foreign troops? Subsequently, can it also be argued that removal of foreign troops will lead to the cessation of suicide

terror acts in Iraq and Afghanistan? This begs other questions – why were there no suicide attacks in Afghanistan, when the mujahideen were waging a jihad against the Soviet occupation?

What are the other compelling factors that have been highlighted linking Islamic fundamentalism, political Islam and suicide terrorism? For Scott Atran, “living mostly in the diaspora and undeterred by the threat of retaliation against original home populations, jihadis, who are frequently middle class, secularly well educated, but often ‘born-again’ radical Islamists, including converts from Christianity, embrace apocalyptic visions for humanity’s violent salvation.” So, is suicide terrorism about “violent salvation?” An interesting argument. However, such an argument is limited only to those who have undertaken suicide missions in the UK. Why is that French Muslims, whose living conditions are comparable to (or perhaps worse than) British Muslims, have not participated in jihad or engaged in suicide terrorism?

The bulk of suicide missions in Iraq and Afghanistan is carried out by the local population, who are not a part of any diaspora. How many suicide missions have been carried out in the countries of origin of the diaspora? One is not sure that the diaspora argument, of being “undeterred by the threat of retaliation against original home populations,” is valid for most suicide missions.

Atran makes another point. “In Muslim countries and across western Europe, bright and idealistic Muslim youth, even more than the marginalized and dispossessed, internalize the jihadi story, illustrated on satellite television and the Internet with the ubiquitous images of social injustice and political repression with which much of the Muslim

world’s bulging immigrant and youth populations intimately identifies. From the suburbs of Paris to the jungles of Indonesia...they are increasingly as willing and even eager to die as they are to kill.” Undoubtedly, the marginalized and the dispossessed Muslim youth from Europe to Australia are upset and angry with political and economic repression. Undoubtedly, there is an element of internalization of this jihad, as has been explicitly expressed by suicide bombers in the UK. The question of import, however, is how much of this internalization has produced suicide terrorists? They may have produced jihadis all over Europe and in Southeast Asia, but how many of these jihadis are willing to kill themselves and others? Why is that among the non-Muslim majority states, only in the UK, has one witnessed suicide attacks and not in France or elsewhere in Europe? What is so peculiar about the UK, that it has produced not only jihadis, but also suicide bombers?

Robert Pape’s argument on this important issue, which is likely to shape the debate on suicide terrorism, is also equally important. He writes, “although religious motives may matter and although Islamic groups receive the most attention in Western media, modern suicide terrorism is not limited to Islamic fundamentalism.” The biggest problem in connecting Islamic fundamentalism and suicide terrorism, as has been linked and delinked in the studies of Atran and Pape, is of how one interprets the numbers. Perhaps, numbers need not be facts.

The most important issue that needs to be understood and discussed in societies ranging from the US to Australia – is the role of religion in supporting or prohibiting suicide bombing. This debate should, in fact, start from whether religion prohibits suicide in the first place. It is clear, that Islam prohibits suicide. Then how can one justify suicide

Can an argument be made then, in countries where terrorist acts are undertaken against foreign occupation that they are not ‘symbolic’ or ‘demonstrative’ in nature, but solely aimed at expelling foreign troops? Subsequently, can it also be argued that removal of foreign troops will lead to the cessation of suicide terror acts in Iraq and Afghanistan? This begs other questions – why were there no suicide attacks in Afghanistan, when the mujahideen were waging a jihad against the Soviet occupation?

attacks in the name of Islam? Though there are huge differences even within the Islamic community on this very issue, this debate should be encouraged further. While most moderate leaders have condemned and issued statements against suicide bombers, radical leaders have based their arguments, justifying suicide terrorism, as a part of jihad.

Finally, a distinction needs to be made in analyzing suicide terrorism, with 9/11 as a benchmark. If numbers are to be the key variable, then during the pre-9/11 period, most suicide attacks took place in Lebanon, Turkey and Sri Lanka. In the post-9/11 period, most of the attacks have taken place in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Palestine. The question that arises at this juncture is, what percentage of suicide attacks were motivated by Islamic fundamentalism in the pre-9/11 period? In other words, how much of suicide terrorism during the aforementioned period was religiously motivated?

Invariably, most pre-9/11 campaigns were secular. Certainly, there was no religious consideration in the suicide attacks carried out by the LTTE and the PKK. Neither Prabhakaran, the leader of the LTTE, nor Abdullah Ocalan, the PKK leader were guided by any religious zeal. Both are secular and to an extent Marxists. Michael Radu of the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) was perhaps the first to link LTTE and PKK to religious sects. However, he is far from the truth when he suggests that “the LTTE and PKK are in a sense “religious” despite their Marxist/separatist claims, inasmuch as they operate like sects (Jim Jones of Guyana fame was also mixing Marxism and religion) and the leaders are God-like figures of absolute political and spiritual authority.”

Hence, it is difficult to agree with Pape’s comment that “Overall, Islamic fundamentalism is associated with about half of the suicide attacks that have occurred from 1980 to 2003.” These attacks may have been carried out by Muslims and some in Muslim majority states, but there are serious questions in linking this first phase of suicide attacks to Islamic fundamentalism.

In the post-9/11 period, which could be considered as the second phase of suicide terrorism, undoubtedly, most of the suicide attacks have been carried out by Muslims. But how many of them have been religiously motivated? Can the suicide attacks in Iraq, Palestine, Afghanistan and Pakistan be blatantly termed as that of Islamic fundamentalists? In Palestine, it is more of a national and secular character, whereas in Iraq, some attacks have been secular and others religious and even sectarian. In Pakistan, the attacks have been primarily religious and sectarian. The role played by al Qaeda and its associates in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan in perpetrating suicide attacks over the last six years, undoubtedly adds a religious colour to them.

The most important issue that needs to be understood and discussed in societies ranging from the US to Australia – is the role of religion in supporting or prohibiting suicide bombing. This debate should, in fact, start from whether religion prohibits suicide in the first place. It is clear, that Islam prohibits suicide. Then how can one justify suicide attacks in the name of Islam?

To conclude, can it then be argued that suicide terrorism today is predominantly led by Islamic fundamentalism? The data is not sufficient enough to make a general statement linking Islamic fundamentalism and suicide terrorism. Not yet. For any generalization, one should start from the 1980s and include the numbers in Lebanon, Sri Lanka and Turkey and the secular nature of those suicide attacks. Focusing only on suicide attacks of the post-9/11 era led by al Qaeda and its affiliates, and linking it to Islamic fundamentalism, may lead to erroneous conclusions.

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3 April 2007, Kirkuk, Iraq

A suicide truck bomber, his deadly payload hidden under bags of flour, crashed into a police station in a Kurdish neighborhood in the disputed city of Kirkuk on Monday. At least 15 people were killed, including a newborn girl and a U.S. soldier, and nearly 200 were wounded.¹

6 April 2007, Ramadi, Iraq

A suicide truck bomb loaded with chlorine gas exploded in Ramadi on Friday, killing as many as 30 people, many of them children, a security official said. The explosion burned victims' lungs, eyes and skin. Dr. Ali Abdullah Saleh, of the main Ramadi hospital, said 30 people had been admitted with shrapnel wounds and 15 had been sent to a second hospital in the city. He said 50 people had been admitted for breathing problems.²

9 April 2007, Mahmudiya, Iraq

A car bomb killed 17 people and wounded two dozen in a town south of Baghdad today...The bombing came as thousands of Iraqis streamed to the holy southern city of Najaf to heed a call by fiery Shi'ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr for a big anti-American protest on Monday.³

11 April 2007, Algiers, Algeria

Two bombings in Algeria, one aimed at the main government building in the country's capital, killed at least 23 people on Wednesday in a sharp escalation of the violence linked to Al Qaeda that has spread across North Africa. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, North Africa's most active terrorist group, claimed responsibility for the attacks....

¹ "Iraqi Bomb Kills 15, Wounds Nearly 200," *Guardian*, 3 April 2007.

² "Chlorine Gas Attack by Truck Bomber Kills Up to 30 in Iraq," *New York Times*, 7 April 2007.

³ "Bomb kills 17 in Iraq town, wounds two dozen," *New Zealand Herald*, 9 April 2007.

The bombing of the government building killed at least 12 people and wounded 118, according to APS, the country's official new agency.... The attacks began at around 10:45 a.m., when a suicide bomber drove an explosives-packed vehicle through the gate at the building housing the prime minister's office.⁴

12 April 2007, Baghdad, Iraq

A suicide bomber driving a truck has blown himself up on a bridge in Baghdad, killing at least 10 people and injuring 26 others according to hospital officials.⁵

12 April 2007, Baghdad, Iraq

An umbrella insurgent group that includes Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia claimed responsibility on Friday for a brazen suicide bombing the previous day [Thursday] inside the Parliament building. The attack killed one legislator and wounded at least 22 other people. The group, the Islamic State of Iraq, has a longstanding goal of toppling the government and driving the Americans from the country.⁶

13 April 2007, Kabul, Afghanistan

A suicide bombing in Kabul killed six people Friday.⁷

14 April 2007, Baghdad, Iraq

In Baghdad, a suicide car bomb killed 10 people on a major bridge in downtown Baghdad – the second attack on a span over the Tigris river this week, police said. The

⁴ "Algerian Blasts by Qaeda Unit Kill at Least 23," *New York Times*, 12 April 2007.

⁵ "Deadly blast damages Baghdad bridge," *AlJazeera*, 12 April 2007.

⁶ "Qaeda Group in Iraq Says It Led Attack on Parliament," *New York Times*, 14 April 2007.

⁷ "Bomber Kills 9 in East Afghanistan," *New York Times*, 15 April 2007.

Jadriyah bridge suffered little damage. At least 15 people were wounded.⁸

14 April 2007, Casablanca, Morocco

Two brothers strapped with explosives blew themselves up near an American cultural center in Casablanca on Saturday, and the police arrested another three people -- including one wearing an explosives belt -- hours later, an official said.... Saturday's two bombers detonated their explosives in the middle of a boulevard that runs behind the American cultural center, killing themselves and wounding a woman, the official said.... The ministry official identified one of the bombers who killed himself on Saturday as Mohamed Maha, born in Casablanca in 1975. The second man was later identified as his brother, Omar Maha, born in 1984 in Casablanca.⁹

14 April 2007, Khost, Afghanistan

A suicide bomber walked to the gate of a border police unit in eastern Afghanistan on Saturday and detonated his explosives, killing at least nine people -- eight policemen and one civilian, local officials said. Five other policemen were wounded. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack, which took place at midmorning outside Khost, a town in eastern Afghanistan.¹⁰

15 April 2007, Baghdad, Iraq

According to the police, a suicide bomber blew himself up in a minibus on a busy street that heads into the Kadhimiya district of north-central Baghdad, a mainly Shiite district, killing at least three people and wounding 11.¹¹

⁸ "Car Bomb in Karbala Kills Dozens of Iraqis," *New York Times*, 14 April 2007.

⁹ "Suicide Bomber Brothers Attack in Casablanca," *New York Times*, 15 April 2007.

¹⁰ "Bomber Kills 9 in East Afghanistan," *New York Times*, 15 April 2007.

¹¹ "34 People Are Killed in Six Bombings in Baghdad; 2 Britons Die in Helicopter Crash," *New York Times*, 16 April 2007.

15 April 2007, Baghdad, Iraq

In the northern city of Mosul, the police said two oil trucks driven by suicide bombers had exploded outside an Iraqi military base in the Yarmouk neighborhood, killing at least four people, including two soldiers, and wounding more than 20 others.¹²

16 April 2007, Kunduz, Afghanistan

A suicide bomber struck a group of police officers in the normally peaceful north of Afghanistan on Monday, killing nine policemen and wounding 25, officials said.... No civilians were harmed.... The attack happened just before 9 a.m. outside a district police station in the city of Kunduz.... Hayatullah Khan, who is believed to be a Taliban commander, claimed responsibility for the Taliban for the bombing on Monday.¹³

18 April 2007, Sadr City, Iraq

A suicide car bomber detonated himself near an Iraqi police checkpoint at an entrance to Sadr City, home to more than 1.5 million people, mostly Shiites. The explosion ripped through a bottleneck of vehicles and pedestrians waiting to pass through the checkpoint, killing at least 17 people and wounding at least 45.¹⁴

18 April 2007, Uaireej, Iraq

In the district of Uaireej, south of Baghdad, a suicide car bomber detonated himself near a police patrol, killing two police officers and wounding four people, including two police officers and two civilians.¹⁵

22 April 2007, Baghdad, Iraq

Two suicide car bombers have rammed their vehicles into an Iraqi police station in

¹² "34 People Are Killed in Six Bombings in Baghdad; 2 Britons Die in Helicopter Crash," *New York Times*, 16 April 2007.

¹³ "Bombing Kills 9 Police Officers in Northern Afghanistan," *New York Times*, 17 April 2007.

¹⁴ "Bombs Rip Through Baghdad, Killing 171," *New York Times*, 19 April 2007.

¹⁵ "Bombs Rip Through Baghdad, Killing 171," *New York Times*, 19 April 2007.

southwest Baghdad, killing at least 13 people and wounding 95, police said. Sunday's attack in the al-Bayaa district, a mostly Shia neighbourhood, was one of the deadliest against Iraqi forces in the capital since a US-backed security crackdown was launched. Police said five of those killed in the co-ordinated attack were policemen, and more than 40 other officers were among the wounded.¹⁶

22 April 2007, Khost, Afghanistan

Two bombings, one of them a suicide attack, rocked the eastern town of Khost on Sunday, killing nine people and wounding more than 40, officials said. The suicide bomber was on foot and blew himself up in a busy market square as the police were pursuing him.... Six people were in critical condition, he said. The three officers who were chasing the bomber were among the wounded, and the senior officer was in critical condition.¹⁷

23 April 2007, Diyala, Iraq

A devastating suicide car bombing on Monday killed nine American soldiers near a patrol base in Diyala Province, the military announced early Tuesday morning.... Twenty soldiers and one Iraqi civilian were also wounded in the blast.¹⁸

23 April 2007, Baquba, Iraq

In Baquba, in Diyala Province, a suicide car bomber attacked a group of police cars parked at an intersection, killing six policemen and a seventh, who was injured, later died.¹⁹

23 April 2007, Baghdad, Iraq

A suicide bomber wearing an explosive vest walked into a popular restaurant near Baghdad's fortified International Zone,

formerly known as the Green Zone, and detonated his explosives, killing six people.²⁰

23 April 2007, northern Iraq

Ten people were killed in northern Iraq when a suicide car bomber struck a Kurdish Democratic Party outpost on Monday.²¹

23 April 2007, Hilla, Iraq

In Hilla, a suicide car bomber attacked a restaurant, killing two people.²²

23 April 2007, Falluja, Iraq

In Falluja, two suicide truck bombs exploded near the Huriyah neighborhood, killing three people.²³

25 April 2007, Paktika, Afghanistan

[A] district governor...survived a suicide attack close to his vehicle. A man detonated his explosives close to the vehicle of the official from Paktika, which is on the border with Pakistan. The bomber was the only individual to die in the attack.²⁴

28 April 2007, Charsadda, Pakistan

Investigators tried Sunday to identify a suicide bomber who attacked a political rally, as the toll from the blast rose to 28 dead and 52 injured, including Pakistan's top security official. Interior Minister Aftab Khan Sherpao was left spattered in blood but only slightly injured in the attack Saturday in Charsadda, a town near his home village in North West Frontier Province.... While officials initially said that 22 people were killed, by Sunday the toll had risen to 28 dead and 52 injured...Police said most of victims were local

¹⁶ "Baghdad police station attacked," *AlJazeera*, 22 April 2007.

¹⁷ "Afghan Bombings Kill 9 and Wound More Than 40," *New York Times*, 22 April 2007.

¹⁸ "9 U.S. Soldiers Killed in Iraq as Suicide Bomber Hits Base," *New York Times*, 24 April 2007.

¹⁹ "9 U.S. Soldiers Killed in Iraq as Suicide Bomber Hits Base," *New York Times*, 24 April 2007.

²⁰ "9 U.S. Soldiers Killed in Iraq as Suicide Bomber Hits Base," *New York Times*, 24 April 2007.

²¹ "9 U.S. Soldiers Killed in Iraq as Suicide Bomber Hits Base," *New York Times*, 24 April 2007.

²² "9 U.S. Soldiers Killed in Iraq as Suicide Bomber Hits Base," *New York Times*, 24 April 2007.

²³ "9 U.S. Soldiers Killed in Iraq as Suicide Bomber Hits Base," *New York Times*, 24 April 2007.

²⁴ "Taliban leader says Bin Laden alive," *AlJazeera*, 25 April 2007.

people, but also included several of Sherpao's police bodyguards.²⁵

28 April 2007, Karbala, Iraq

A car bomber struck Saturday in Karbala, killing at least 58 people and wounding 169 in the second attack in two weeks against the city's holy sites...The Karbala attack took place about a third of a mile from the Imam Abbas shrine, the second-holiest site in Shiite Islam, on a busy commercial street packed with shoppers.²⁶

5 May 2007, Abu Ghraib, Iraq

At least 10 people have died and 13 have been wounded in a suicide bombing at an Iraqi army recruiting centre west of Baghdad. The bomber detonated a vest of explosives as potential recruits were gathering at the centre in Abu Ghraib, a town on the outskirts of the capital. The BBC has reported that all the men killed in the suicide bombing are believed to be Sunni Arabs from the surrounding area.²⁷

6 May 2007, Samarra, Iraq

In the volatile city of Samarra, a suicide car bomber attacked a police battalion headquarters, killing the police chief and 11 others.²⁸

6 May 2007, Baghdad, Iraq

A suicide bomber blew up his truck at a sprawling fruit and vegetable market in southwest Baghdad in the Baya neighborhood during the height of the morning rush, killing at least 35 people and wounding more than 80... Precise fatality numbers were unclear since officials at Yarmouk Hospital said they counted 52 dead from the bomb, and the United States military put the number at 30.²⁹

²⁵ "Pakistan probes suicide attack as death toll rises to 28," *International Herald Tribune*, 28 April 2007.

²⁶ "Dozens Killed in Bomb Attack on Shiite Shrine," *New York Times*, 29 April 2007.

²⁷ "Iraq bomber kills army recruits," *BBC News Website*, 5 May 2007.

²⁸ "Suicide Bomber Kills Police Recruits in Samarra," *New York Times*, 6 May 2007.

²⁹ "Suicide Bomber Kills At Least 35 Iraqi's at Vegetable Market," *New York Times*, 6 May 2007.

7 May 2007, Ramadi, Iraq

Two suicide car bombers have killed at least 24 people near the Iraqi city of Ramadi, west of Baghdad, police say. The first exploded in a busy market in Albu Thiyab, to the east of Ramadi, killing at least 15 and injuring 30. The other targeted a police checkpoint some 15 minutes later in the town of al Jazeera. Five police officers and five bystanders died. Ten people were hurt.³⁰

8 May 2007, Kufa, Iraq

A suicide car bomber struck a market in the southern Iraqi city of Kufa today, killing at least 16 people and wounding 70.³¹

11 May 2007, Baghdad, Iraq

Suicide truck bombers struck Iraqi police checkpoints on two bridges in a Shi'ite area south of Baghdad, killing 22 people and badly damaging one of the bridges. Police said 60 people were wounded.³²

13 May 2007, Abril, Iraq

Fifty people were killed and 70 wounded when a suicide truck bomb exploded near the local office of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in Makhmour, near Arbil, 350 km (220 miles) north of Baghdad, Governor Duraid Kashmula of Nineveh province said.³³

14 May 2007, Baghdad, Iraq

A suicide car bomber killed two Iraqi soldiers and wounded four others at a major intersection in western Baghdad.³⁴

15 May 2007, Mosul, Iraq

Four Iraqi soldiers were wounded in an attack by a suicide car bomber on their checkpoint

³⁰ "Ramadi hit by twin bomb attacks," *BBC News Website*, 7 May 2007.

³¹ "Suicide blast kills 16 in southern Iraqi city," *Guardian*, 8 May 2007.

³² "Security Developments in Iraq," *Reuters AlertNet*, 11 May 2007.

³³ "Security Developments in Iraq," *Reuters AlertNet*, 13 May 2007.

³⁴ "Security Developments in Iraq," *Reuters AlertNet*, 14 May 2007.

near Mosul, 390 km (240 miles) north of Baghdad, an Iraqi army spokesman said.³⁵

15 May 2007, Peshawar, Pakistan

Twenty five people were killed and up to 35 injured when a suicide bomber blew himself up on the ground floor of the Marhaba Hotel owned by an Afghan national here on Tuesday.³⁶

17 May 2007, Qandahar, Afghanistan

Three people have been killed in a suicide bombing in the southern Afghan city of Kandahar which left the culture minister slightly hurt, officials say. The bomber rammed his car into a convoy of government vehicles carrying the minister, Abdul Kareem Khuram, said provincial governor Assadullah Khalid.... The suicide bombing in Kandahar came in the early evening. The three people killed were reported to be civilians.³⁷

19 May 2007, Kunduz, Afghanistan

A suicide attacker on foot blew himself up near German soldiers in a busy street market in the northern province of Kunduz, killing three of the soldiers and at least six civilians, Afghan officials said. It was the worst attack against German soldiers in four years. The attack occurred when the soldiers, who were in Kunduz as part of an international reconstruction team, got out of their vehicle near the market, said the governor of Kunduz, Said Muhammad Omar. Three German soldiers were killed and two other German soldiers with their Afghan interpreter were injured, and six civilians including a woman and a child were killed, he said, adding that 14 civilians had been wounded, including two children. A Taliban spokesman claimed responsibility for the bombing.³⁸

20 May 2007, Baghdad, Iraq

³⁵ "Security Developments in Iraq," *Reuters AlertNet*, 15 May 2007.

³⁶ "25 die in suicide blast at Peshawar hotel," *Daily Times*, 16 May 2007.

³⁷ "Afghan minister hurt in bombing," *BBC News Website*, 17 May 2007.

³⁸ "Suicide Bomber Kills 3 Soldiers in Afghanistan," *New York Times*, 20 May 2007.

Two Iraqi Army soldiers died in western Baghdad on Sunday, an Interior Ministry official said, one when a suicide bomber in a vehicle rammed an Iraqi Army convoy and the other when a car bomb detonated at a checkpoint.³⁹

21 May 2007, Gardez, Afghanistan

At least 10 people were killed and 32 were wounded Sunday when a suicide bomber struck at a crowded market in the southeastern province of Paktia, the provincial police chief said. News agencies said the death toll later rose to 14, quoting doctors at the local hospital. The attack happened in the town of Gardez...the suicide bombing on Sunday might have been a revenge attack after coalition and Afghan forces killed 67 Taliban insurgents in fighting the day before in the Patan district of Paktia Province.⁴⁰

22 May 2007, Ankara, Turkey

Investigators have concluded that a suicide bomber carried out an attack that killed six people and injured dozens in Turkey's capital, using methods similar to those of a Kurdish rebel group, a top official said Wednesday.... The attack came at the start of the tourist season, and the injured included eight Pakistanis in Ankara for a weeklong international defense industry fair about 12 miles from the shopping mall. Authorities earlier said 102 people were hurt, but the governor put the final injury toll at 91.⁴¹

23 May 2007, Kabul, Afghanistan

A suicide bomber has killed two people and injured at least four others in the Afghan capital, Kabul, police say. The bomber, who was riding a motorbike, blew himself up next to highway police guarding a road construction project.... The motorbike-borne bomber struck on the Jalalabad Road in Kabul – an area used by the military and security companies and which has seen the

³⁹ "7 U.S. Soldiers Die in Iraq, 6 in Sweep of Baghdad," *New York Times*, 21 May 2007.

⁴⁰ "Suicide Bomber Kills at Least 10 at Market in Afghanistan," *New York Times*, 21 May 2007.

⁴¹ "Suicide Bomb Suspected in Turkey Attack," *Guardian*, 23 May 2007.

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largest number of attacks in Kabul. A policeman believed to have been guarding a road building project was killed along with a civilian passer-by, police say.... A Taliban spokesman has claimed responsibility for the attack.⁴²

24 May 2007, Falluja, Iraq

The growing confrontation between tribal leaders in Anbar Province and Al Qaeda took a violent turn on Thursday when a suicide bomber drove into a crowd gathering for a funeral procession in the volatile city of Falluja, killing at least 27 people and wounding dozens of others.⁴³

27 May 2007, Ramadi, Iraq

A car bomb in a busy market killed seven people and wounded 12 on Sunday in the western outskirts of Ramadi, 110 km (70 miles) west of Baghdad, a hospital source said. Police said a suicide car bomber rammed his car into their checkpoint, wounding three policemen and a child.⁴⁴

28 May 2007, Kunduz, Afghanistan

In the north, a suicide bomber attacked a convoy of foreign security contractors, killing himself and two Afghan civilians. It was the fourth such attack in the north in the past two weeks.... The suicide attack on Monday, in Kunduz, was aimed at private security contractors who slowed for a speed bump, Agence France-Presse reported, quoting local police officials. It said the Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack.⁴⁵

31 May 2007, Falluja, Iraq

In western Iraq on Thursday, a suicide bomber hit a police recruiting center in Fallujah, and there were conflicting reports about the death toll. Police said as many as 25 people were

⁴² "Suicide bomber kills two in Kabul," *BBC News Website*, 23 May 2007.

⁴³ "Iraqi Tribal Leader Is Killed, and Mourners Are Attacked," *New York Times*, 25 May 2007.

⁴⁴ "Security developments in Iraq," *Reuters AlertNet*, 27 May 2007.

⁴⁵ "Rise in Violence in North Shows Afghanistan's Fragility," *New York Times*, 29 May 2007.

killed, but the U.S. military said just one policeman died.⁴⁶

31 May 2007, Ramadi, Iraq

Three policemen and three civilians were killed and 15 civilians were wounded when a suicide truck bomber struck a communications center on the western outskirts of Ramadi, according to Anbar provincial security adviser Col. Tariq Youssef Mohammed.⁴⁷

1 June 2007, Baghdad, Iraq

A US military soldier was killed by a suicide bomber when a US patrol attempted to question two men near a mosque southwest of Baghdad on Friday.⁴⁸

2 June 2007, Baramulla, India

Facing reverses at the receiving end for over a year now, militants today launched a major offensive against Police and security forces with a major suicide strike in Baramulla district and a powerful explosion in the Capital city of Srinagar in which two personnel and two militants got killed and 38 personnel sustained injuries.⁴⁹

A suicide car bomber killed 10 people and wounded 30 in a busy market in a volatile region northeast of Baghdad on Sunday, police said. The bomber targeted a convoy of police vehicles as it drove through a market area in the town of Balad Ruz, about 50 km (30 miles) southeast of Diyala province's capital Baquba, said Balud Ruz police chief Colonel Faris Hussein. Two police officers were among the dead, he said. At least 10 cars, six of them police vehicles, were destroyed by fire, Hussein said.⁵⁰

⁴⁶ "Sunnis revolt against al-Qaida in Iraq," *Associated Press*, 31 May 2007.

⁴⁷ "Sunnis revolt against al-Qaida in Iraq," *Associated Press*, 31 May 2007.

⁴⁸ "Seven American soldiers killed in Iraq attacks," *Gulfnews.com*, 4 June 2007.

⁴⁹ "Militants intensify offensive with blasts, fidayeen in Valley," *Daily Excelsior*, 2 June 2007.

⁵⁰ "Car bomb kills 10 in Iraq's Diyala – police," *Reuters AlertNet*, 3 June 2007.

4 June 2007, Mogadishu, Somalia

A militant Islamist group on Monday claimed responsibility for a suicide bomb that killed seven people at the home of Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Gedi.... Five soldiers and two civilians died when the bomber detonated a vehicle rigged with explosives at the gates of his large compound in a heavily guarded northern neighbourhood.... A group calling itself the Mujahideen Youth Movement said in a statement on the Internet that "a lion...our brave brother Abdul-Aziz Mohammad Semter...carried out a heroic martyrdom operation at the residence of the apostate prime minister."⁵¹

4 June 2007, Tunceli, Turkey

Three soldiers were killed in a suicide bomb attack on a police station in the eastern Turkish province of Tunceli on Monday, security sources said. It was not clear who was behind the attack, which occurred in a region where Kurdish separatist guerrillas are active. Ten people were injured in the attack.⁵²

5 June 2007, Baghdad, Iraq

Three police commandos were wounded when they shot dead a female suicide bomber who was trying to detonate herself near a recruitment centre in eastern Baghdad, police said. The policemen were wounded when the bomber's vest exploded.⁵³

5 June 2007, Falluja, Iraq

Eighteen people were killed south of Falluja on Tuesday when a suicide bomber driving a truck packed with explosives plowed into a busy commercial district, the local Iraqi police said. Fifteen others were wounded.⁵⁴

7 June 2007, Rabia, Iraq

⁵¹ "Islamist militants claim suicide attack on Somali PM," *Reuters AlertNet*, 4 June 2007.

⁵² "3 killed in suicide attack in Turkey," *Daily Times*, 4 June 2007.

⁵³ "Security developments in Iraq," *Reuters AlertNet*, 5 June 2007.

⁵⁴ "Suicide Attack Near Falluja Kills 18 in Commercial Area," *New York Times*, 6 June 2007.

A suicide bomber detonated his explosives and a bus bomb exploded minutes apart near a police station in northern Iraq on Thursday, killing at least nine people and wounding 22, the authorities said.... The double bombing on Thursday occurred in Rabia, a town about 75 miles northwest of Mosul, near the Syrian border.⁵⁵

9 June 2007, al-Iskandiriya, Iraq

A suicide truck bomber killed 12 Iraqi soldiers and wounded 30 others in an attack on an army checkpoint south of Baghdad on Saturday, police said. There was some confusion over whether the huge explosion happened in Jurf al-Sakhar near the predominantly Shi'ite city of Hilla, 100 km (60 miles) south of the capital, or in nearby al-Iskandiriya.⁵⁶

8 June 2007, Daquq, Iraq

At least 34 others were killed in two bombing attacks, one in the northern city of Daquq, about 30 miles south of Kirkuk, and the other in the southern city of Qurna, 60 miles north of Basra.... The Daquq bombings struck a Shiite mosque and a nearby police station. The attack began when two suicide bombers detonated explosive vests in the forecourt of a mosque frequented by supporters of the Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr followed by a car bomb close by, according to the local police. They said at least 19 people died, and more than 20 were wounded.⁵⁷

10 June 2007, Salahaddin, Iraq

A suicide truck bomb killed 14 policemen and wounded 42 at a police station north of Baghdad on Sunday.... Among the dead were five officers, including two colonels, police in the nearby provincial capital Tikrit said. More than 30 police were among some 50 people wounded.⁵⁸

⁵⁵ "Bombs and Gunmen in Iraq Kill at Least 22 and Wound 55," *New York Times*, 7 June 2007.

⁵⁶ "Suicide bomber kills 12 south of Baghdad – police," *Reuters AlertNet*, 9 June 2007.

⁵⁷ "Wife and Son of Police Chief Are Among 50 Killed in Iraq," *New York Times*, 9 June 2007.

⁵⁸ "Iraq bombs kill 14 policemen, hit bridge," *Reuters AlertNet*, 10 June 2007.

10 June 2007, Iraq

U.S. forces were hit by [a] suicide bomber at a checkpoint south of the capital... U.S. military spokesman Lieutenant-Colonel Christopher Garver said some U.S. forces had to be evacuated after the attack on the checkpoint near a major bridge but no other details about the number or nature of casualties were known.⁵⁹

11 June 2007, Khost, Afghanistan

On Monday, a suicide bomber's car struck a police checkpoint outside the provincial town of Khost in eastern Afghanistan, wounding three policemen, one critically, and eight civilians.⁶⁰

13 June 2007, Ramadi, Iraq

Four Iraqi policemen were killed and 11 officers wounded by a suicide car bomber targeting their checkpoint outside Ramadi, 110 km (68 miles) west of Baghdad.⁶¹

14 June 2007, Riyadh, Iraq

A suicide bomber wounded three policemen and three soldiers in the town of Riyadh, 60 km southwest of Kirkuk, police said.⁶²

15 June 2007, central Afghanistan

A suicide car bomber who apparently intended to strike a NATO convoy on Friday in southern Afghanistan killed 10 people, including five children and a Dutch soldier, during a fresh wave of violence that also left more than 24 militants dead, officials said.... The car bombing was in Tirin Kot in Uruzgan Province, said the Dutch defense minister, Eimert van Middelkoop. Four Afghan men were also killed, said Gen. Abdul Qasem Khan, the provincial police chief. Three Dutch soldiers and seven Afghan civilians, including

⁵⁹ "Iraq bombs kill 14 policemen, hit bridge," *Reuters AlertNet*, 10 June 2007.

⁶⁰ "Afghan Forces Found Bomb Like Type Used in Iraq," *New York Times*, 12 June 2007.

⁶¹ "Security developments in Iraq," *Reuters AlertNet*, 13 June 2007.

⁶² "Security developments in Iraq," *Reuters AlertNet*, 14 June 2007.

two women, were wounded when the bomber detonated the bomb near a Dutch armored car in Tirin Kot, officials said.⁶³

15 June 2007, Qandahar, Afghanistan

A suicide bomber on foot attacked a foreign troop convoy in the southern Kandahar city, wounding at least five civilians, a police official said.⁶⁴

16 June 2007, Kabul, Afghanistan

A suicide car-bomber attacked a convoy of foreign troops on Saturday in the Afghan capital, killing four civilians, police and government officials said, in the third such attack on international forces in two days. A suicide attacker drove a car packed with explosives at troops from the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in western Kabul, but none of the soldiers were killed or wounded, interior ministry spokesman Zemarai Bashary said. He said the four killed had been all men and that five civilians were also wounded in the blast.⁶⁵

16 June 2007, Afghanistan

Late on Saturday a suicide bomber killed two civilians while attacking a NATO convoy, a command statement said.⁶⁶

17 June 2007, Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan

A suicide bomber on a motorcycle attacked a military convoy in the north Afghan city of Mazar-e-Sharif. One Afghan civilian was killed and several injured but no soldiers were hurt.⁶⁷

17 June 2007, Kabul, Afghanistan

A Taliban suicide bomber blew up a police transport bus here on Sunday, killing around

⁶³ "Afghan Bomber Kills 10, Including 5 Children," *New York Times*, 15 June 2007.

⁶⁴ "Suicide bomber kills four in Afghan capital," *Reuters AlertNet*, 16 June 2007.

⁶⁵ "Suicide bomber kills four in Afghan capital," *Reuters AlertNet*, 16 June 2007.

⁶⁶ "Attack on police bus in Kabul kills 35," *Daily Times*, 18 June 2007.

⁶⁷ "Kabul police bus bomb 'kills 35'," *BBC News Website*, 17 June 2007.

35 people, police said, in apparently the single deadliest bombing to hit Afghanistan since the Taliban were removed from power in 2001. "More than 35 are killed," said Kabul police (Criminal branch) chief Ali Shah Paktiawal. "Police officers are among the dead." The Interior Ministry said five of the wounded were foreigners, but none died.⁶⁸

19 June 2007, Baghdad, Iraq

A suspected al Qaeda bomber killed 78 people when he rammed a truck into a Shi'ite mosque in Baghdad on Tuesday...Police said 78 [toll rose to 87] people had been killed, including at least nine women, and 224 others were wounded.⁶⁹

21 June 2007, Sulaiman Bek, Iraq

A suicide truck bomber killed at least 13 people when he rammed his vehicle into the municipal headquarters of a northern Iraqi town ...Police said the blast took place in Sulaiman Bek, a town 90 km (55 miles) south of Kirkuk. They said the dead included women and children and that at least 35 people had been wounded.⁷⁰

24 June 2007, Khiyam, Lebanon

A car bomb, "most likely" driven by a suicide bomber, killed six U.N. peacekeepers in south Lebanon... police source said a mangled car was found at the scene with human remains inside.... A United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) statement said six soldiers had been killed and two wounded in the attack. Earlier, Spanish Defence Minister Jose Antonio Alonso said two Spanish and three Colombian peacekeepers, all serving in the Spanish army, had been killed in the blast. The ministry later confirmed one of three wounded Spanish soldiers had subsequently died.⁷¹

⁶⁸ "Attack on police bus in Kabul kills 35," *Daily Times*, 18 June 2007.

⁶⁹ "Bomb kills 78 in Baghdad, U.S. in big offensive," *Reuters*, 19 June 2007.

⁷⁰ "Suicide truck bomber kills 13 in N.Iraq attack," *Reuters AlertNet*, 21 June 2007.

⁷¹ "Car bomb kills 6 U.N. soldiers in south Lebanon," *Reuters AlertNet*, 24 June 2007.

25 June 2007, Baiji, Iraq

The death toll from a suicide truck bomb attack on a police building in the northern Iraqi oil city of Baiji rose to 27, with 13 police among the dead, police said. They said 62 people had also been wounded when the suicide bomber rammed his fuel tanker into protective walls outside the building.⁷²

25 June 2007, Baghdad, Iraq

Ten people were killed when a suicide bomber wearing an explosives-packed vest blew himself up inside a central Baghdad hotel used by foreigners and Iraqi officials, police said. Police said the bomber had walked into the busy lobby of the Mansour Hotel, where Sunni Arab tribal leaders from western Anbar province had gathered for a meeting.... Police said at least 15 people were wounded.⁷³

25 June 2007, Hilla, Iraq

A suicide car bomb attack killed eight people and wounded 25 in the Iraqi city of Hilla. They said the attack took place outside the governor's office in the centre of the largely Shi'ite city, 100 km (62 miles) south of Baghdad. One witness said the car blew up at the fence of the governor's compound. Another said the bomber blew up his vehicle at a checkpoint outside.⁷⁴

27 June 2007, al-Jaderiyia, Iraq

A suicide car bomb targeting a police commando checkpoint killed one policeman and wounded three other officers in the al-Jaderiyia district of southern Baghdad, police said.⁷⁵

28 June 2007, Kabul, Afghanistan

[A] bomber exploded his car near the vehicle of a private security company involved in mentoring the Afghan police, Afghan security

⁷² "Death toll in N.Iraq bomb attack rises to 27-police," *Reuters AlertNet*, 25 June 2007.

⁷³ "Ten killed in Baghdad hotel suicide attack-police," *Reuters AlertNet*, 25 June 2007.

⁷⁴ "Car bombing in Iraq's Hilla kills 8, wounds 25," *Reuters AlertNet*, 25 June 2007.

⁷⁵ "Security developments in Iraq," *Reuters AlertNet*, 27 June 2007.

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officials said. "Two Americans are dead and five Afghan civilians are wounded," city's criminal investigation chief Alishah Paktiawal said.... The Taliban claimed responsibility⁷⁶

28 June 2007, Paktika, Afghanistan

[A] suicide bomb struck a vehicle of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in a remote area of the eastern province of Paktika, ISAF and an eyewitness said. "It was a car bomb," ISAF spokesman Major John Thomas said. "We have got ISAF casualties and local casualties ... from what we know now they are all injuries," he said. A witness, Mohammad Shah, said the attacker had driven an explosive-filled car into an ISAF vehicle near a hospital being built with help from the foreign forces.⁷⁷

30 June 2007, Baghdad, Iraq

A suicide bomber dressed as a policeman killed at least six people when he blew himself up outside a police recruitment centre north east of Baghdad, an Iraqi army source said. The source said 30 people were wounded when the bomber detonated his explosives beside a queue of people waiting to enter the recruitment office.⁷⁸

⁷⁶ "2 Americans among 4 killed in Kabul suicide attacks," *Daily Times*, 29 June 2007.

⁷⁷ "2 Americans among 4 killed in Kabul suicide attacks," *Daily Times*, 29 June 2007.

⁷⁸ "At least six Iraqis killed by suicide bomber," *Reuters AlertNet*, 30 June 2007.

CHRONOLOGY

Suicide Attacks in 2007 (Apr-June)

Srinjoy Bose
Research Officer, IPCS

Date	Month	Country	Place	Location/Target	Casualties			Injured	Terrorist Group	Modus operandi
					SFs	Civ	Total			
2	April	Iraq	Kirkuk	Police Station	1	14	15	200		Truck Bomber
6	April	Iraq	Ramadi			30	30	95		Truck Bomber (Chlorine)
9	April	Iraq	Mahmudiya			17	17	24		Car Bomber
12	April	Iraq	Baghdad	Bridge		10	10	26		Truck Bomber
11	April	Algeria	Algiers	Government Building and Police Station		23	23	162	Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb	Car Bomber (2)
12	April	Iraq	Baghdad	Parliament Building		1	1	22	Islamic State of Iraq	Bomber
13	April	Afghanistan	Kabul		6		6		Taliban	Bomber
14	April	Iraq	Karbala	Bus Stop		56	56	70		Car Bomber
14	April	Iraq	Baghdad	Jadriyah Bridge		10	10	15		Car Bomber
14	April	Morocco	Casablanca	American Cultural Centre				1		Bomber (2)
14	April	Afghanistan	Khost	Border Police Unit Gate	8	1	9	5	Taliban	Bomber

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Date	Month	Country	Place	Location/Target	Casualties			Injured	Terrorist Group	Modus operandi
					SFs	Civ	Total			
15	April	Iraq	Baghdad			34	34	60		Bomber, Car Bomber (2)
15	April	Iraq	Mosul	Iraqi Military Base	2	2	4	20		Truck Bomber (2)
16	April	Afghanistan	Kunduz	Police Station	9		9	25	Taliban	Bomber
18	April	Iraq	Baghdad	Police Checkpoint		17	17	45		Car bomber
18	April	Iraq	Baghdad	Police Patrol	2		2	4		Car Bomber
22	April	Iraq	Baghdad	Police Station	5	8	13	95		Car Bomber (2)
22	April	Afghanistan	Khost	Market				6		Bomber
23	April	Iraq	Diyala	American Patrol Base	9		9	20		Car Bomber
23	April	Iraq	Baghdad	Restaurant		6	6			Bomber
23	April	Iraq	Northern Iraq	Kurdish Democratic Party Outpost			10			Car Bomber
23	April	Iraq	Baquba	Police Cars	7		7			Car Bomber
23	April	Iraq	Hilla	Restaurant		2	2			Car Bomber
23	April	Iraq	Fallujah			3	3			Car Bomber (2)
25	April	Afghanistan	Paktika	District Governor						Bomber

Date	Month	Country	Place	Location/Target	Casualties			Injured	Terrorist Group	Modus operandi
					SFs	Civ	Total			
28	April	Pakistan	Charsadda	Political Rally/Interior Minister			28	52		Bomber
28	April	Iraq	Karbala	Commercial Street			58	169		Car Bomber
5	May	Iraq	Abu Ghraib	Army Recruiting Centre			10	13		Bomber
5	May	Iraq	Baghdad		1		1			Bomber
6	May	Iraq	Samarra	Police Headquarters	12		12			Car Bomber
6	May	Iraq	Baghdad	Market		35	35	80		Truck Bomber
7	May	Iraq	Albu Thiyab	Market		15	15	30		Car Bomber
7	May	Iraq	al Jazeera	Police Checkpoint	5	5	10	10		Car Bomber
8	May	Iraq	Kufa	Market		16	16	70		Car Bomber
11	May	Iraq	Baghdad	Bridges/Police Checkpoints			22	60		Truck Bomber (2)
13	May	Iraq	Makhmour	Kurdistan Democratic Party Local Office			50	70		Truck Bomber
14	May	Iraq	Baghdad		2		2	4		Car Bomber
15	May	Iraq	Mosul	Army Checkpoint				4		Car Bomber
15	May	Pakistan	Peshawar	Marhaba Hotel		25	25	35		Bomber

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Date	Month	Country	Place	Location/Target	Casualties			Injured	Terrorist Group	Modus operandi
					SFs	Civ	Total			
17	May	Afghanistan	Qandahar	Government Convoy		3	3			Car Bomber
19	May	Afghanistan	Kunduz	Market/German Soldiers	3	6	9	17	Taliban	Bomber
20	May	Iraq	Baghdad	Iraqi Army Convoy	1		1			Car Bomber
20	May	Iraq	Ramadi	Police Checkpoint	6	5	11	52		Truck Bomber
20	May	Afghanistan	Gardez	Market			14	32		Bomber
22	May	Turkey	Ankara	Shopping Mall		6	6	91		Bomber
23	May	Afghanistan	Kabul	Police	1	1	2	4	Taliban	Motorbike Bomber
24	May	Iraq	Fallujah	Funeral Procession			27			Car Bomber
27	May	Iraq	Ramadi	Police Checkpoint				4		Car Bomber
28	May	Afghanistan	Kunduz	Security Contractors		2	2		Taliban	Bomber
31	May	Iraq	Fallujah	Police Recruiting Centre			25			Bomber
31	May	Iraq	Ramadi	Communications Centre	3	3	6	15		Truck Bomber
1	June	Iraq	Baghdad	US Army Patrol	1		1			Bomber
2	June	India	Baramulla	Security Forces	2		2	38		Bomber

Date	Month	Country	Place	Location/Target	Casualties			Injured	Terrorist Group	Modus operandi
					SFs	Civ	Total			
3	June	Iraq	Balad Ruz	Market/Police Convoy	2	8	10	30		Car Bomber
3	June	Somalia	Mogadishu	Prime Minister's Compound	5	2	7		Mujahideen Youth Movement	Car Bomber
4	June	Somalia	Mogadishu	Army Headquarters				1		Car Bomber
4	June	Turkey	Tuceli	Police Station	3		3	10		Bomber
5	June	Iraq	Baghdad	Police Recruitment Centre				3		Bomber
5	June	Iraq	Fallujah				18	15		Truck Bomber
7	June	Iraq	Rabia	Police Station			9	22		Bomber
8	June	Iraq	Daquq	Shia Mosque			19	20		Bomber (2)
9	June	Iraq	Al.Iskandiriya	Army Checkpoint	12		12	30		Truck Bomber
10	June	Iraq	Salahaddin	Police Station	14		14	42		Truck Bomber
10	June	Iraq	Baghdad	US Checkpoint/Bridge						Bomber
11	June	Afghanistan	Khost	Police Checkpoint				11		Car Bomber
13	June	Iraq	Ramadi	Police Checkpoint	4		4	11		Car Bomber
14	June	Iraq	Riyadh					6		Bomber

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Date	Month	Country	Place	Location/Target	Casualties			Injured	Terrorist Group	Modus operandi
					SFs	Civ	Total			
15	June	Afghanistan	Uruzgan	NATO Convoy	1	9	10	10		Car Bomber
15	June	Afghanistan	Qandahar	NATO Convoy			5			Bomber
16	June	Afghanistan	Kabul	NATO Convoy		4	4	5		Car Bomber
17	June	Afghanistan	Mazar-e-Sharif	Military Convoy		1	1			Motorbike Bomber
17	June	Afghanistan	Kabul	Police Transport Bus	35		35	5	Taliban	Bomber
19	June	Iraq	Baghdad	Shia Mosque		87	87	224	al Qaeda	Truck Bomber
21	June	Iraq	Sulaiman Bek	Municipal Headquarters		13	13	35		Truck Bomber
24	June	Lebanon	Khiyam	UN Peacekeepers	6		6	2		Car Bomber
25	June	Iraq	Baiji	Police Headquarters	13	14	27	62		Truck Bomber
25	June	Iraq	Baghdad	Mansour Hotel		10	10	15		Bomber
25	June	Iraq	Hilla	Provincial Governor's Compound		8	8	25		Car Bomber
27	June	Iraq	Baghdad	Police Checkpoint	1		1	3		Car Bomber
28	June	Afghanistan	Kabul	Security Vehicles			4	5	Taliban	Car Bomber

Date	Month	Country	Place	Location/Target	Casualties			Injured	Terrorist Group	Modus operandi
					SFs	Civ	Total			
28	June	Afghanistan	Paktika	NATO Vehicle					Taliban	Car Bomber
30	June	Iraq	Baghdad	Police Recruitment Centre			6	30		Bomber